Randomizing Quantum States: Constructions and Applications by Hayden, Patrick et al.
ar
X
iv
:q
ua
nt
-p
h/
03
07
10
4 
v3
   
15
 Ju
n 
20
04
Randomizing quantum states:
Constructions and applications
Patrick Hayden,1, 2, ∗ Debbie Leung,1, 2, † Peter W. Shor,3, ‡ and Andreas Winter4, 2, §
1Institute for Quantum Information, Caltech 107–81, Pasadena, CA 91125, USA
2Mathematical Sciences Research Institute, 1000 Centennial Drive, Berkeley, CA 94720, USA
3AT & T Labs Research, Florham Park, NJ 07922, USA
4Department of Computer Science, University of Bristol,
Merchant Venturers Building, Woodland Road, Bristol BS8 1UB, United Kingdom
(Dated: May 30, 2006)
The construction of a perfectly secure private quantum channel in dimension d is known
to require 2 log d shared random key bits between the sender and receiver. We show that
if only near-perfect security is required, the size of the key can be reduced by a factor of
two. More specifically, we show that there exists a set of roughly d log d unitary operators
whose average effect on every input pure state is almost perfectly randomizing, as com-
pared to the d2 operators required to randomize perfectly. Aside from the private quantum
channel, variations of this construction can be applied to many other tasks in quantum in-
formation processing. We show, for instance, that it can be used to construct LOCC data
hiding schemes for bits and qubits that are much more efficient than any others known,
allowing roughly log d qubits to be hidden in 2 log d qubits. The method can also be used
to exhibit the existence of quantum states with locked classical correlations, an arbitrarily
large amplification of the correlation being accomplished by sending a negligibly small clas-
sical key. Our construction also provides the basic building block for a method of remotely
preparing arbitrary d-dimensional pure quantum states using approximately log d bits of
communication and log d ebits of entanglement.
PACS numbers: 03.65.Ta, 03.67.Hk
Keywords: randomization,quantum cryptography,private quantum channel, data hiding,locking cor-
relations,entropic uncertainty relations
I. INTRODUCTION
In this paper we revisit the question of finding the minimal resources required to randomize a
quantum state. This problem has previously been investigated in several variations, always with
the conclusion that in order to randomize or, more generally, encrypt a quantum state of l qubits,
2l classical bits of random key are required [1, 2, 3]. This factor of 2 represents a familiar and
even welcome phenomenon in quantum information theory; the reason for its appearance is inti-
mately connected to the existence of superdense coding [3, 4]. All this previous work, however,
considered only the task of perfectly encrypting quantum states. Here we focus on the task of ap-
proximately encrypting quantum states, allowing a negligible but non-zero amount of information
to remain available to an eavesdropper. In sharp contrast to the exact case, in this setting we find
that the factor of 2 disappears entirely: an l-qubit quantum state can be approximately encrypted
using l + o(l) bits of random key.
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2Our encryption or, more specifically, randomization scheme also exposes a previously unob-
served difference between classical and quantum correlations: classical correlations are always
effectively destroyed by a local randomization procedure whereas quantum correlations need not
be. Therefore, any correlation that survives local randomization must be “nonlocal” and, hence,
quantummechanical in nature. This basic insight provides the intuition behind a new scheme for
data hiding in a bipartite system [5, 6, 7]. The encoding is an approximate randomization proce-
dure applied collectively to the two l-qubit shares of a 2l-qubit system, calibrated to eliminate all
correlations that can be detected by local operations and classical communication (LOCC). The
failure of the encoding to destroy quantum correlations is striking: there exists a collective decod-
ing operation that recovers all the states on an [l − o(l)]-qubit subsystem of the input. In other
words, randomization can be used to construct schemes for LOCC hiding of roughly l qubits in
a 2l-qubit quantum state. This construction is far more efficient than any previously known for
hiding qubits or even classical bits.
Another variation on our basic construction can be used to find quantum states whose classical
correlations are large but locked. Roughly speaking, this means that local measurements can yield
classical data with only a small amount of correlation but that local operations supplementedwith
a small amount of communication can yield a disproportionately large amount of correlation. The
existence of such states was demonstrated in Ref. [8] but some central questions about the range
of possible effects were left open. In particular, the authors defined two figures of merit, one
measuring the (reciprocal of) amplification of the correlation and the other the ratio of the amount
of communication to the amount of unlocked correlation. We give the first demonstration that
both quantities can go to zero simultaneously. While seemingly esoteric, the existence of this
phenomenon has important implications for the definition of security in quantum cryptographic
scenarios; in particular, it establishes the potentially enormous volatility of accessible informa-
tion. There is also an alternative interpretation of this result: we prove that random observables
typically obey extremely strong entropic uncertainty relations.
One final application of the ability to randomize an l-qubit state using only l + o(l) random
key bits has a sufficiently different character that we present it in a separate paper [9]. Insofar as
teleportation [10], or more generally remote state preparation [11], can be interpreted as a method
for encrypting quantum states [12, 13], our approximate encryption procedure should give rise to
an approximate remote state preparation method consuming only half as much communication
as teleportation. We report in [9] how our results on randomization provide the basic building
block for a protocol capable of sending an arbitrary pure l-qubit quantum state using only l ebits
and l + o(l) bits of classical communication.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section II describes our results on the private
quantum channel, which serve as a prototype for the rest of the paper. Section III then studies
approximately randomizing maps by characterizing their effect on classical and quantum corre-
lations. These observations are then put to use in slightly modified form in section IV, which
describes our quantum data hiding protocol and proves both its correctness and security. Section
V then formalizes the idea of locking classical correlations and describes our contribution. We
also include an appendix establishing some results on randomization procedures using subsets of
the unitary group, such as the Pauli matrices.
We use the following conventions throughout the paper. log and exp are always taken base
2. Unless otherwise stated, a “state” can be pure or mixed. The symbol for a state (such as ϕ
or ρ) also denotes its density matrix. “Part of an entangled state” refers to a (mixed) state whose
purification is accessible to some of the parties. Wewill make an explicit indication when referring
to a pure state. The density operator |ϕ〉〈ϕ| of the pure state |ϕ〉 will frequently be written simply
as ϕ. B(Cd) will be used to denote the set of linear operators from Cd to itself and U(d) ⊂ B(Cd)
the unitary group on Cd.
3Finally, a word of warning about the cryptographic interpretation of our results. When we
say that a scheme for approximate encryption or quantum data hiding is secure for mixed states,
it should be assumed that the purifications of those mixed states are inaccessible to all parties
considered. Indeed, the possibility that purification-inaccessible security criteria can hold even
as purification-accessible criteria fail is essentially a quantum mechanical re-statement of a famil-
iar cryptographic observation: approximate security is sometimes much easier to achieve than
perfect security. We exploit the gap throughout this paper.
II. AN APPROXIMATE PRIVATE QUANTUM CHANNEL
We consider an insecure one-way quantum channel between two parties Alice and Bob that
is noiseless in the absence of eavesdropping. This channel can be made secure against eaves-
dropping if Alice and Bob are allowed the extra resource of shared random secret key bits. For
instance, one can encrypt a state |ϕ〉 ∈ Cd using a secret key of length 2 log d as follows [2, 3]. Fix
a basis {|1〉, . . . , |d〉} for Cd and let
X|j〉 = |(j + 1) mod d〉 and Z|j〉 = e2πij/d|j〉. (1)
It’s straightforward to verify that
1
d2
d∑
j=1
d∑
k=1
XjZkϕZk
†
Xj
†
=
I
d
(2)
for all states ϕ. If j and k are selected using a shared secret key, Alice can encrypt the state using
the unitary operation XjZk and Bob can decrypt by applying Z−kX−j . By Eq. (2), the view of
an eavesdropper without access to j and k is I/d, which is independent of the input state ϕ. This
structure, consisting of a set of encoding maps and decoding maps indexed by key values, such
that the average encoded state is independent of the input, is known as a private quantum channel
for Cd. (See Ref. [3] for a formal definition.) In fact, if perfect security is required, it can be shown
that the secret keymust have length at least 2 log d [1, 2, 3, 13]. Here we relax the security criterion.
Definition II.1 A completely positive, trace-preserving (CPTP) map R : B(Cd) → B(Cd) is ǫ-
randomizing if, for all states ϕ, ∥∥∥∥R(ϕ)− Id
∥∥∥∥
∞
≤ ǫ
d
. (3)
In the above, ‖·‖∞ is the operator norm, so Eq. (3) is equivalent to all the eigenvalues ofR(ϕ) lying
in the interval [(1 − ǫ)/d, (1 + ǫ)/d]. By convexity of the norm, it suffices to check the condition
for all pure states, a fact we will use repeatedly. In quantum information, distinguishability is
frequently measured using the trace norm ‖ · ‖1 = Tr | · |, the analogue of variation distance in
probability theory. Note that Eq. (3) automatically implies the weaker estimate ‖R(ϕ)− I/d‖1 ≤ ǫ.
The main result of this section is
Theorem II.2 For all ǫ > 0 and sufficiently large d (> 10ǫ ), there exists a choice of unitaries in U(d),
{Uj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} with n = 134d(log d)/ǫ2 such that the map
R(ϕ) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j (4)
on B(Cd) is ǫ-randomizing.
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FIG. 1: A private quantum channel built on the randomization map R. Alice and Bob share knowledge of
the secret key j, using it to encrypt and decrypt the state. Because an eavesdropper does not have access
to j, her view is R(ϕ) ≈ I/d. If ϕ is a d-dimensional quantum state, then the key length need only be
log d+ o(log d).
As illustrated in figure 1, by having Alice and Bob select j using a shared secret key, thismapR can
be used to build a private quantum channel with key length log n = log d+log log d+log(1/ǫ2)+8,
albeit one that is not perfectly secure, only nearly so. The view of an eavesdropper without access
to the key, given a particular input state ϕ, is precisely R(ϕ). Definition II.1, therefore, doubles as
a definition of security. For any distribution of states {pi, ϕi} supported on Cd we can bound the
mutual information accessible to an eavesdropper who performs measurements on the encrypted
states R(ϕi). This accessible information is bounded above by the Holevo quantity [14]
χ = S
(∑
i
piR(ϕi)
)
−
∑
i
piS(R(ϕi)) (5)
≤ log d−
∑
i
piS
(
R(ϕi)
)
(6)
≤ log(1 + ǫ) ≤ ǫ/(ln 2). (7)
The second inequality is true because the definition of ǫ-randomizing maps implies that R(ϕi) ≤
(1 + ǫ)I/d, which allows for an application of the monotonicity of log. In particular, for all α > 0,
choosing ǫ = (log d)−α implies that χ d→∞−−−→ 0. In this case, n = 134 d (log d)(1+2α), so the key size
can be taken to be log d+ (1 + 2α) log log d+ 8. Alternatively, one can choose an arbitrarily small
α > 0, and let ǫ = d−α. Then, χ ≤ d−α/(ln 2) which is exponentially decaying in the number
of qubits to be encrypted, log d. This comes at the cost of a slight increase in the asymptotic key
length: log n = (1 + 2α) log d+ log log d+ 8. Moreover, as is common with probabilistic existence
proofs, it is possible to ensure that the overwhelming majority of random choices succeed at only
minor additional cost; in this case, log n would need to be increased by a constant number of bits
for any fixed probability of success. Analogous statements hold for our other constructions later
in the paper.
The proof of theorem II.2 is based on a large deviation estimate, lemma II.3, and discretization
via a net construction, lemma II.4, both of which will be re-used in other applications later in
the paper. The large deviation estimate, in turn, is based on Crame´r’s theorem (see Ref. [15],
for example, for a detailed exposition), which states that for independent, identically distributed
5(i.i.d.) real-valued random variables, X,X1,X2, . . . ,Xn,
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≥ a
)
≤ exp
(
−n 1
ln 2
inf
x≥a
Λ∗(x)
)
and (8)
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≤ a
)
≤ exp
(
−n 1
ln 2
inf
x≤a
Λ∗(x)
)
, (9)
where
Λ∗(x) = sup
λ∈R
[
λx− lnEeλX
]
. (10)
Λ∗(x) is known as the rate function and EeλX the moment generating function. (In fact, the harder
part of Crame´r’s theorem deals with the optimality of the rate function. We only need bounds
(8) and (9) here, which are surprisingly easy to prove: they require only the Bernstein trick and
Markov’s inequality.)
Lemma II.3 Letϕ be a pure state, P a rank p projector and let (Uj)j≥1 be an i.i.d. sequence of U(d)-valued
random variables, distributed according to the Haar measure. There exists a constant C (C ≥ (6 ln 2)−1)
such that if 0 < ǫ < 1,
Pr


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(UjϕU
†
jP )−
p
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫp
d

 ≤ 2 exp (−Cnpǫ2) . (11)
Proof Since the Haar measure is left and right invariant, we may assume that ϕ = |1〉〈1| and P =∑p
i=1 |i〉〈i| for some fixed orthonormal basis {|i〉}. Let |gj〉 =
∑d
i=1 gij |i〉, where the i.i.d. complex
random variables gij ∼ NC(0, 1). (That is, the real and imaginary parts of gij are independent
gaussian random variables with mean 0 and variance 1/2.) The distribution of |gj〉 is the same
as the distribution for ‖gj‖2 Uj |1〉. For a fixed j, let U = Uj and |g〉 = |gj〉. The convexity of exp
implies that
Eg exp
(
λ
d
p∑
i=1
|〈i|g〉|2
)
= EUEg exp
(
λ‖g‖22
d
p∑
i=1
|〈i|U |1〉|2
)
(12)
≥ EU exp
(
Eg
λ‖g‖22
d
p∑
i=1
|〈i|U |1〉|2
)
(13)
= EU exp
(
λ
p∑
i=1
|〈i|U |1〉|2
)
(14)
= EU exp
(
λTr(UϕU †P )
)
. (15)
This inequality betweenmoment generating functions establishes, via Crame´r’s theorem, that the
rate function Λ∗U for the random variable Tr(UϕU
†P ) and the rate function Λ∗p for
1
d
∑p
i=1 |〈i|g〉|2
are related by the inequality Λ∗p(x) ≤ Λ∗U (x). It follows from the definitions that Λ∗p(px/d), in turn,
is equal to pΛ∗g(x), where Λ∗g is the rate function for |gij |2. Therefore,
Pr

 1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(UjϕU
†
jP )−
p
d
≥ ǫp
d

 ≤ exp(−np 1
ln 2
inf
x≥ǫ
Λ∗g(1 + x)
)
. (16)
6The rate function Λ∗g can be evaluated directly, with the result that Λ∗g(1 + ǫ) ≥ Cǫ2, where C can
be chosen to be the constant (6 ln 2)−1 [9]. Repeating the argument for deviations below the mean
and applying the union bound completes the proof. ⊓⊔
As an aside, we note that the probability density function for Tr(UjϕU
†
jP )was recently calculated
exactly by Zyczkowski and Sommers [16]. In principle, this should allow for an exact calculation
of the rate function Λ∗U .
Lemma II.4 For 0 < ǫ < 1 and dimH = d there exists a setM of pure states in H with |M| ≤ (5/ǫ)2d,
such that for every pure state |ϕ〉 ∈ H there exists |ϕ˜〉 ∈ M with ∥∥|ϕ〉〈ϕ| − |ϕ˜〉〈ϕ˜|∥∥
1
≤ ǫ. (We call such a
set an ǫ–net.)
Proof We begin by relating the trace norm to the Hilbert space norm:
∥∥|ϕ˜〉 − |ϕ〉∥∥2
2
= 2− 2Re 〈ϕ˜|ϕ〉
≥ 1− |〈ϕ˜|ϕ〉|2
=
(
1
2
∥∥|ϕ˜〉〈ϕ˜| − |ϕ〉〈ϕ|∥∥
1
)2
,
(17)
where the last line can be shown by evaluating the eigenvalues of |ϕ˜〉〈ϕ˜| − |ϕ〉〈ϕ|. Thus it will be
sufficent to find an ǫ/2–net for the Hilbert space norm. LetM = {|ϕi〉 : 1 ≤ i ≤ m} be a maximal
set of pure states satisfying ‖|ϕi〉−|ϕj〉‖2 ≥ ǫ/2 for all i and j. (Such a set exists by Zorn’s lemma.)
By definition,M is an ǫ/2–net for ‖·‖2. We can then estimatem by a volume argument. As subsets
of R2d, the open balls of radius ǫ/4 about each |ϕi〉 are pairwise disjoint and all contained in the
ball of radius 1 + ǫ/4 centered at the origin. Therefore,
m(ǫ/4)2d ≤ (1 + ǫ/4)2d. (18)
⊓⊔
Proof (Of theorem II.2) Let (Uj)j≥1 be i.i.d. U(d)-valued random variables, distributed according
to the Haar measure. We will show that with high probability the corresponding R in Eq. (4) is
ǫ-randomizing. The proof will consist of bounding
Pr
U

sup
ϕ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∞
≥ ǫ
d

 = Pr
U

sup
ϕ
sup
ψ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(UjϕU
†
jψ)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫ
d

 . (19)
The optimizations over ϕ and ψ can both be taken over pure states only by the convexity of | · |.
Fix a net of projectorsM = {X} and let ϕ˜ be the net point corresponding to ϕ so that
sup
ϕ
‖ϕ− ϕ˜‖1 ≤ ǫ
2d
. (20)
7Define ψ˜ similarly. Lemma II.4 provides a net with |M| ≤ (10dǫ )2d. We can then proceed as follows:
Pr
U

sup
ϕ
sup
ψ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(UjϕU
†
jψ)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫ
d


≤ Pr
U
(
sup
ϕ
sup
ψ
1
n
n∑
j=1
∣∣∣Tr(UjϕU †jψ)− Tr(Ujϕ˜U †j ψ˜)∣∣∣ (21)
+
∣∣∣∣ 1n
n∑
j=1
Tr(Ujϕ˜U
†
j ψ˜)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫd
)
≤ Pr
U

sup
ϕ
sup
ψ
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(Ujϕ˜U
†
j ψ˜)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫ
2d

 . (22)
In the last inequality, we used the estimate∣∣∣Tr(UjϕU †jψ)− Tr(Ujϕ˜U †j ψ˜)∣∣∣ ≤ ∥∥ϕ− ϕ˜∥∥∞ + ∥∥ψ − ψ˜∥∥∞, (23)
which, because ϕ − ϕ˜ and ψ − ψ˜ are traceless and either zero or rank 2, is equal to 12‖ϕ − ϕ˜‖1 +
1
2‖ψ − ψ˜‖1. This sum is then less than or equal to ǫ/(2d) by construction of the net.
Next, we replace the optimization over the set of all pure states in Eq. (22) by optimization
over the net, use the union bound and apply lemma II.3:
Pr
U

 max
ϕ˜, ψ˜ ∈M
∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(Ujϕ˜U
†
j ψ˜)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫ
2d

 (24)
≤ |M|2 max
ϕ˜, ψ˜ ∈M
Pr
U


∣∣∣∣∣∣
1
n
n∑
j=1
Tr(Ujϕ˜U
†
j ψ˜)−
1
d
∣∣∣∣∣∣ ≥
ǫ
2d

 (25)
≤
(
10d
ǫ
)4d
exp
(
−Cnǫ
2
4
)
, (26)
whereC ≥ (6 ln 2)−1 is the same constant as in the proof of lemma II.3. The existence of the desired
ǫ-randomizing map is guaranteed if the above probability is bounded away from 1, which is the
case if n > 16d
Cǫ2
log(10dǫ ). If d >
10
ǫ , this is true when when n ≥ 192(ln 2)ǫ−2d log d.
⊓⊔
III. RANDOMIZATION AND THE DESTRUCTION OF CORRELATIONS
Our discussion in the previous section demonstrates that a quantum operation R constructed
by averaging over 134d(log d)/ǫ2 randomly selected unitaries will be ǫ-randomizing with high
probability. In this section, our goal will be to investigate the properties of general ǫ-randomizing
maps so the method used to construct R will be immaterial as long as
‖R(ϕ)− Id‖∞ ≤ ǫd (27)
for all ϕ. The definition, it should be noticed, makes no mention of the effect of R on a system
that is correlated with another system (we call this the “environment”). Here we will analyze that
effect, which will ultimately lead to a partial characterization of all ǫ-randomizing maps.
8To start, it is easy to verify that an ǫ-randomizing R properly destroys classical correlations
between the system being randomized and its environment:
Lemma III.1 Let ρAB =
∑
i pi ϕ
A
i ⊗ ψBi be a separable state and R an ǫ-randomizing map on A. Then
‖(R⊗ I)(ρAB)− Id ⊗ ρB‖1 ≤ ǫ. (28)
Proof This is straightforward:
∥∥(R⊗ I)(ρAB)− Id ⊗ ρB∥∥1 =
∥∥∥∥∥
∑
i
pi[R(ϕ
A
i )⊗ ψBi − Id ⊗ ψBi ]
∥∥∥∥∥
1
(29)
≤
∑
i
pi
∥∥R(ϕAi )⊗ ψBi − Id ⊗ ψBi ∥∥1 (30)
=
∑
i
pi‖R(ϕAi )− Id‖1 (31)
≤ ǫ. (32)
⊓⊔
Thus, for classically correlated states, approximate randomization implies the destruction of cor-
relations with other systems. Indeed, for classically correlated states, finding an operation that
will destroy correlations is effectively the same thing as finding an operation that will erase local
information.
This equivalence fails dramatically for entangled states. (In contrast, any perfectly random-
izing map does destroy all possible correlations including entanglement.) Indeed, if we ap-
ply an R constructed using the method of theorem II.2 to half of a maximally entangled state
|Φ〉 = 1√
d
∑d
j=1 |i〉|i〉, then the resulting state has rank at most n = o(d2), so
‖(R ⊗ I)(Φ)− 1d2 I⊗ I‖1 ≤ 2(1 − n/d2)
d→∞−−−→ 2, (33)
meaning that (R ⊗ I)(Φ) and 1
d2
I ⊗ I can be distinguished by a collective measurement with
negligible probability of error for large d. It goes without saying then that the approximate ran-
domization does not eliminate all the correlations that were originally present in the maximally
entangled state. Nonetheless, the correlations that remain have been rendered invisible to local
operations and classical communication, recovering at least some of the spirit of lemma III.1.
Lemma III.2 Let R be an ǫ-randomizing quantum operation, M = {Mi} be a positive operator-valued
measure (POVM) that can be implemented using LOCC, pi :=Tr(Mi(R ⊗ I)(Φ)) and qi :=Tr(Mi 1d2 I).
Then ‖p− q‖1 ≤ ǫ.
Proof IfM can be implemented using LOCC then it will have the separable formMi = Xi ⊗ Yi.
Moreover, we can assume without loss of generality that Xi and Yi are rank 1 since refining the
measurement can only increase the ℓ1 distance between the outcome probability distributions.
Making use of the identities YiTrYi = Y
2
i and (I ⊗ Yi)Φ(I ⊗ Yi) = 1dY Ti ⊗ Yi, the demonstration is
9then direct:
‖p − q‖1 =
∑
i
∣∣∣Tr[(Xi ⊗ Yi)(R ⊗ I)(Φ)]− Tr[(Xi ⊗ Yi) Id2 ]
∣∣∣ (34)
=
∑
i
∣∣∣Tr[(Xi ⊗ I)(R ⊗ I)( Y TiTr Y Ti ⊗ Yid )−Tr[(Xi ⊗ Yi) Id2 ]
∣∣∣ (35)
=
∑
i
∣∣∣Tr[Xi(R( Y TiTr Y Ti )− Id )]
∣∣∣∣∣∣Tr Yid ∣∣∣ (36)
≤
∑
i
ǫ
d2
Tr(Xi)Tr(Yi) ≤ ǫ, (37)
where in the last step we have used that
∑
iXi ⊗ Yi = I and the fact that R is ǫ-randomizing. ⊓⊔
A very similar proof demonstrates the more general
Theorem III.3 Let M = {Mi} be a POVM that can be implemented using LOCC, pi := Tr(Mi (R ⊗
I)(ρAB)) and qi := Tr(Mi (
1
dI⊗ ρB)). Then ‖p− q‖1 ≤ ǫ.
Thus, while some kind of correlation can persevere when half of an entangled state is random-
ized, that correlation will all be inaccessible to LOCCmeasurements. In fact, the proof shows that
it will be inaccessible to all measurements that can be implemented using separable superopera-
tors. It’s tempting to speculate that lemma III.2 provides a characterization of all ǫ-randomizing
operations. There is at least a weak sense in which that is true: if the conclusion of lemma III.2
holds for a map R, then for all states ϕ,
‖R(ϕ) − Id‖1 ≤ ǫ. (38)
Recall that this condition is weaker than the operator norm definition of ǫ-randomization that we
use, however. This might suggest that our definition is too strong and that this trace norm version
might be more easily characterized. Unfortunately, our proof of lemma III.2 makes explicit use of
the stronger condition. We don’t know if it would hold forR only satisfying Eq. (38). The fact that
ǫ-randomizing maps render the correlations of entanglement invisible to LOCC also raises the
question of their relationship to the phenomenon of quantum nonlocality without entanglement
[17]. The range of connections between ǫ-randomizing maps and the physics of nonlocality will
be further developed in a upcoming paper [18].
IV. QUANTUMDATA HIDING
Theorem III.3 also immediately suggests another application of ǫ-randomizingmaps: quantum
data hiding, the name given to schemes for sharing bits or qubits betweenmultiple parties in such
a way that the data cannot be accessed by LOCC operations alone. We will focus on the bipartite
case, where our methods provide a protocol for hiding l qubits in a bipartite state of roughly
2l qubits. This is far more efficient than previous constructions for hiding either bits or qubits,
where the best previous constructions gave ratios that depended on the security requirements. To
achieve δ = ǫ = 1/16 in terms of the parameters introduced below, for example, the separable
Werner state construction of Ref. [5] requires roughly 24 qubits per hidden bit. (Using, in the
notation of that paper, K = 4 and d = 64.) To achieve qubit hiding, the construction of Ref. [6]
would have multiplied that overhead by a further dimension-dependent factor. (We note that
by making additional assumptions about the operations available to the parties, it is possible to
improve on the 1 : 2 ratio between hidden and physical qubits. It was recently discovered, for
example, that in some systems with superselection rules, a ratio of 1 : 1 is achievable [19].)
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Definition IV.1 (Adapted from Ref. [6]) A (δ, ǫ, p, q)-qubit hiding scheme consists of a CPTP en-
coding map E : B(Cp)→ B(Cq) and a CPTP decoding mapD : B(Cq)→ B(Cp) such that
1. (Security) For all LOCC measurements L, as well as all states ϕ0 and ϕ1 on C
p,
‖L(E(ϕ0))− L(E(ϕ1))‖1 ≤ ǫ. (39)
2. (Correctness) For all states ϕ on Cp, ‖(D ◦ E)(ϕ) − ϕ‖1 ≤ δ.
The security criterion obviously implicitly assumes some bipartite structure Cq ∼= HA ⊗ HB . In
our constructions, we will set dim(HA) = dim(HB) = d. Our main result is
Theorem IV.2 For all δ, ǫ > 0 (satisfying ǫ2 log(40/δ2) < 1) and sufficiently large d (d >
max{ 36
Cδ2
,
√
15/ǫ, 21}), one can construct a (δ, ǫ, p, d2)-qubit hiding scheme, with
p =
Cδ2ǫ2d
1188 log d
. (40)
and C = (6 ln 2)−1. The encoding map is given by
R(ρ) =
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjρU
†
j (41)
where {Uj} ⊂ U(d2), and n = 99Cǫ2 d log d.
The main point, unfortunately obscured by the proliferation of constants and conditions is simply
this: for these hiding schemes, the limiting ratio of hidden qubits to physical qubits is
lim
d→∞
log p
log d2
=
1
2
. (42)
The idea behind our approach is simple. We randomly choose the Uj acting on theAB system.
With n sufficiently large, we can assure that for all ρ, R(ρ) is effectively indistinguishable (by
LOCC alone) from themaximally mixed state onAB. Thenwe restrict the input ρ to have support
on a sufficiently small subspace S to ensure that the subspaces {UjS} can be reliably distinguished
by a collective measurement on AB. This strategy is summarized in figure 2.
We will prove the security and correctness in the next two subsections.
A. Security of the protocol
The proof of security uses techniques similar to those in the proofs of lemmas II.3 and III.2,
so we only give the outline here. As usual, let {Uj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} be U(d2)-valued independent
random variables distributed according to the Haar measure. For 0 < ǫ < 1,
Pr
U

sup
ϕ∈S
sup
X⊗Y
∣∣∣∣Tr [ 1n
n∑
j=1
(X ⊗ Y )Uj ϕU †j
]
− 1
d2
∣∣∣∣ ≥ ǫd2

 ≤ 2 |Md|2|Mp| exp
(
−Cnǫ
2
4
)
, (43)
where X and Y are d-dimensional rank 1 projectors acting on A and B respectively, and ϕ ∈ S is
a p-dimensional pure state (to be hidden). C is the same positive constant as in lemma II.3, Md
andMp are ǫ3d2 -nets for d-dimensional and p-dimensional rank 1 projectors respectively. Eq. (43)
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Uj
j
Alice: HA
Bob: HB
|ϕ〉 ∈ S R(ϕ)
U1S
U2S U3S
U4S
U5SU6SU7S
U8S
HA ⊗HB
(a) (b)
FIG. 2: Quantum data hiding. (a) depicts the encoding procedure. A random Uj is applied to the state
|ϕ〉 drawn from subspace S. The output, R(ϕ), is almost indistinguishable from the maximally mixed state
using LOCC alone. (b) The different subspaces {UjS} have very small overlaps, however, so a collective
operation on HA ⊗ HB can be used to distinguish them without causing much distortion to the encoded
states Uj |ϕ〉.
can be proved in a way very similar to lemma II.3. From lemma II.4 we can choose |Md|2|Mp| =
(15d2/ǫ)2(2d+p). Whenever d2 > max(15/ǫ, 16) and n ≥ 33(2d + p)(log d)/(Cǫ2), the probability in
Eq. (43) is strictly less than 1/2, in which case more than half of the choices for {Uj} are such that
for all ϕ,M and N ,
∣∣∣∣Tr [ 1n
n∑
j=1
(M ⊗N)Uj ϕU †j
]
− 1
d2
∣∣∣∣ ≤ ǫd2 . (44)
To finish the proof of security, we use arguments similar to those in lemma III.2. Let Uj be
chosen so that R(ϕ) = 1n
∑n
j=1 UjϕU
†
j satisfies Eq. (44). Let {Xi ⊗ Yi} be any POVM implemented
by LOCC, where Xi and Yi are both rank 1. For any state ϕ ∈ S, let pi = Tr((Xi ⊗ Yi)R(ϕ)) and
qi = Tr((Xi ⊗ Yi) Id2 ). Using Eq. (44) we find
‖p − q‖1 =
∑
i
∣∣Tr((Xi ⊗ Yi)R(ϕ)) − 1d2 Tr(Xi ⊗ Yi)∣∣ (45)
≤
∑
i
ǫ
d2 Tr(Xi ⊗ Yi) ≤ ǫ. (46)
Therefore, when the conditions stated above on n, d and ǫ are satisfied, the security condition is
fulfilled with probability at least 1/2 for a random selection of unitaries.
B. Correctness of the protocol
To complete the construction of the data hiding scheme, we must also show that the decoding
can be performed reliably. Let S be a fixed subspace of dimension p in HA ⊗HB and let P be the
projector onto S. Our decoding procedure will be given by the transpose channel [20], a generaliza-
tion of the pretty good measurement [21]. Specifically, let N =
∑n
i=1 UiPU
†
i and Di = PU
†
i N
−1/2.
Our decoding procedure D will be given by performing the quantum operation with Kraus ele-
mentsDi. Our proof that this decoding procedure works is via a reduction to the task of decoding
classical data, for which there are well-known criteria for the success of the pretty good measure-
ment [22].
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Fixing 0 < α < 1, our goal will be to ensure that |〈ϕ|DiUi|ϕ〉|2 ≥ 1 − α for all i = 1, . . . , n and
whenever |ϕ〉 ∈ S. Then, 〈ϕ|D◦R(ϕ)|ϕ〉 ≥ 1−α. It would then follow by standard inequalities [23]
that ‖D ◦ R(ϕ) − ϕ‖1 ≤ 2
√
α and, choosing α = δ2/4, that the correctness criterion is satisfied.
To begin, fix any basis E = {|j〉} for S. Our strategy is to first show that, for any given i and |j〉,
the operation D decodes Ui|j〉 correctly with high probability by relating D to the pretty good
measurement for decoding classical messages. We then show that D succeeds on all pure input
states by verifying that it succeeds simultaneously on a large enough set of bases to effectively
cover the set of all states.
So, consider decoding the classical messages i = 1, · · · , n and j = 1, · · · , p by applying
the pretty good measurement to the set of states {Ui|j〉}ij . The POVM elements are Mij =
N−1/2Ui|j〉〈j|U †i N−1/2. This POVM can be implemented in two stages: first D is applied and
the outcome i is recorded, then the projective measurement onto the basis E is performed. To see
this, observe that
〈j|DiρD†i |j〉 = 〈j|PU †i N−1/2ρN−1/2UiP |j〉 (47)
= 〈j|U †i N−1/2ρN−1/2Ui|j〉 (48)
= Tr(ρMij). (49)
In particular, this calculation also demonstrates that
|〈j|DiUi|j〉|2 = Tr(Ui|j〉〈j|U †iMij) (50)
so the decoding procedure D succeeds on |j〉 provided that for each i, the pretty good measure-
ment identifies Ui|j〉 with high probability. Applying the criterion of Hausladen et al. for the
success of the pretty good measurement [22], we find that
1− |〈j|DiUi|j〉|2 ≤ ∆ij :=
∑
i′j′ 6=ij
|〈j|U †i Ui′ |j′〉|2. (51)
Notice that terms for which j′ 6= j and i′ = i do not contribute to∆ij so its expectation value is
EU∆ij =
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′
Tr[EUUi|j〉〈j|U †i Ui′ |j′〉〈j′|U †i′ ] (52)
=
∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′
Tr[ I
d2
I
d2
] =
(n− 1)p
d2
, (53)
which is small provided np≪ d2. We will be interested in
Pr
U
(
∆ij ≥ (1 + η) (n−1)pd2
)
, (54)
which by the left invariance of the Haar measure is equal to
Pr
U

∑
i′ 6=i
∑
j′
|〈j|Ui′ |j′〉|2 ≥ (1 + η) (n−1)pd2

 . (55)
Invoking lemma II.3 with η = 1/2, the state |j〉〈j| and projector∑pj′=1 |j′〉〈j′|, the probability that
∆ij exceeds
3(n−1)p
2d2
is less than or equal to exp(−C (n−1) p/4) for the same positive constant C in
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lemma II.3. By the union bound, the probability that this bad event happens for at least one of the
choices of i is less than or equal to n exp(−C (n−1) p/4):
Pr
U
(
min
i
|〈j|DiUi|j〉|2 ≤ 1− 3(n−1)p2d2
)
≤ n exp(−C(n− 1)p/4). (56)
Now, as discussed earlier, our goal is to verify that |〈ϕ|DiUi|ϕ〉|2 will be large for all |ϕ〉 ∈ S.
Fix an α2 -net for pure states on S. The size of this net can be taken to be less than or equal to (
10
α )
2p.
Extend each net point ϕ˜ to a basis of S. We have
Pr
U
(
min
ϕ˜
min
i
|〈ϕ˜|DiUi|ϕ˜〉|2 ≤ 1− 3(n−1)p2d2
)
≤ (10α )2p n exp(−C4 (n−1)p) (57)
by Eq. (56) and the union bound. The probability ofD failing on at least one net point is less than
1/2 if n > 8C log(
10
α ) +
4
C
log 2n
p + 1. Otherwise,
|〈ϕ|DiUi|ϕ〉|2 ≥ |〈ϕ˜|DiUi|ϕ˜〉|2 −
∣∣∣ |〈ϕ|DiUi|ϕ〉|2 − |〈ϕ˜|DiUi|ϕ˜〉|2 ∣∣∣
≥ 1− 3(n−1)p
2d2
− α2 = 1− α (58)
for all |ϕ〉 ∈ S by choosing 3(n− 1)p/d2 = α.
That is essentially the end of the proof. All that remains is to make appropriate choices for
our various parameters. Collecting all our requirements, we find that the correctness condition
‖D ◦R(ϕ)− ϕ‖1 ≤ δ for all ϕ is satisfied with probability at least 1/2 if
n > 8C log(
10
α ) +
4
C
log 2n
p + 1, (59)
α = δ2/4 and 3(n − 1)p/d2 = α. Recall that the security criterion is satisfied with probability at
least 1/2 provided n ≥ 33(2d + p)(log d)/(Cǫ2) and d > max(√15/ǫ, 4). Restricting to p ≤ d, we
make the choice
n =
99
Cǫ2
d log d , and then p =
Cǫ2δ2
1188
d
log d
. (60)
If, in addition, d > max( 36
Cδ2
, 21) and log(40/δ2) < 1/ǫ2, a straightforward calculation shows
that all our requirements are met. Therefore, by the union bound, the probability that both the
correctness and security criteria are satisfied is greater than 0 for a random choice of R. As an
example, when ǫ = δ = 116 , and d is sufficiently large, log p ≥ log d − log log d − 30. Finally, both
δ and ǫ can be chosen to be any polynomial in 1log d without affecting the asymptotic efficiency,
and can be chosen to be d−α for small α > 0 in order to achieve security that is exponential in
2 log d, the number of physical qubits, at the expense of a slightly reduced asymptotic efficiency
(1− 4α)/2.
V. LOCKING CLASSICAL CORRELATIONS
Define the maximum classical mutual information that can be obtained by local measurements
X ⊗ Y on a bipartite state ρAB as
Ic(ρ) = maxX⊗Y I(x : y), (61)
where x and y are random variables representing the outcomes of measurements X and Y on
ρAB and I(x : y) is equal to H(x) + H(y) − H(x, y) for the Shannon entropy H . Now suppose
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that ρ′AB is obtained from ρAB by communicating l classical bits present in Alice’s system to Bob.
There are natural cryptographic reasons to worry about the relationship between Ic(ρ), Ic(ρ
′)
and l. Suppose, for example, that an eavesdropper, initially uncorrelated with a quantum state,
can extract Ic(ρ) bits of mutual information about some secret classical data by performing a
measurement on the state. If instead the eavesdropper started with l classical bits potentially
correlated with the secret, one would hope that the most the eavesdropper could learn upon
performing hermeasurementwould be less than Ic(ρ)+lD bits for some constantD. The existence
of locked classical correlations in the form presented here demonstrates that such bounds fail
drastically in general. As a consequence then, it is generally muchmore prudent to use theHolevo
χ quantity instead of the accessible information when bounding an eavesdropper’s information.
(χ does obey simple bounds of the desired type.)
In their paper introducing the idea of locked classical correlations, DiVincenzo et al. [8] defined
two figures of merit,
r1 =
Ic(ρ)
Ic(ρ′)
and r2 =
l
Ic(ρ′)− Ic(ρ) . (62)
Ideally, the two should be small simultaneously: the first is the ratio of the initial to the final
information while the second measures the ratio of the “key length” to the unlocked information.
In their paper, they found examples for which (r1, r2) ∼ (12 , 1log d ) and (r1, r2) ∼ ( 12 log d , 12 ). Here
we show that r1 and r2 can be made arbitrarily small at the same time, meaning that the amount
of information unlocked is large relative both to the amount of information originally available
and relative to the number of classical bits communicated from Alice to Bob.
Theorem V.1 For all ǫ, δ > 0 there exist bipartite states ρAB with r1 ≤ ǫ and r2 ≤ δ. Alice’s system
may be taken to be a classical system of log d+ 3 log log d bits and Bob’s a quantum system of log d qubits
provided ǫ is smaller than some fixed constant, log d > 16C′′ǫ log
20
ǫ (where C
′′ is a positive constant) and
δ ≥ 3 log log d
(1− ǫ/2) log d. (63)
As in the original work, the states we consider will have the form
ρAB =
1
dn
d∑
i=1
n∑
j=1
|ij〉〈ij|A ⊗ (Uj |i〉〈i|U †j )B , (64)
where the {|ij〉A} and {|i〉B} are orthonormal, d = dim(B) and the Uj are unitary. Thus, j can be
thought of as a label describing which orthonormal basis is used on Bob’s system to encode i. For
such states, a convexity argument (see Ref. [8]) quickly implies that
Ic(ρ) ≤ log d+maxϕ 1
n
∑
ij
|〈ϕ|Uj |i〉|2 log |〈ϕ|Uj |i〉|2. (65)
The communication of j, which requires l = log n bits, obviously yields a state ρ′ for which
Ic(ρ
′) = log d + log n so an investigation of the locking properties of ρ will hinge on bounding
the second term of Eq. (65). Letting pji = |〈ϕ|Uj |i〉|2 and pj = (pj1, . . . , pjd), this second term
is equal to − 1n
∑
j H(pj). (Note that pji and pj are functions of ϕ, although we have suppressed
the dependence in our notation.) As usual, we will proceed by selecting the operators Uj at ran-
dom using the Haar measure, in which case this average entropy quantity will be provably large.
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Indeed, a now familiar type of calculation (see appendix B, with the substitution ǫ 7→ ǫ/2) demon-
strates that there is a positive constant C ′′ such that
Pr
(
inf
ϕ
1
n
n∑
j=1
H(pj) ≤ (1−ǫ/2) log d− 3
)
≤ (20ǫ )2d exp
(
− n ( ǫdC′′4(log d)2 − 1)) , (66)
provided ǫ < 2/5 and d ≥ 7. Choosing n = (log d)3 and log d to be larger than 16C′′ǫ log 20ǫ then en-
sures that the probability is bounded away from 1. It’s worth pausing to interpret this statement:
it means that there is a choice of n bases that is highly incommensurate with all states ϕ, in the
sense that averaged over bases, the entropy of the probability distribution induced by measuring
any fixed ϕ is almost maximal. Returning to locking, we see that there exists a choice of unitaries
such that
Ic(ρ) ≤ log d− [(1− ǫ/2) log d− 3] = ǫ2 log d+ 3. (67)
We can then estimate, using the facts that 3/ log d < ǫ/2 and d ≥ 7,
r1 ≤
ǫ
2 log d+ 3
log d+ 3 log log d
≤ ǫ (68)
r2 ≤ 3 log log d
(1− ǫ/2) log d. (69)
The general mathematical question we addressed in this section amounts to quantifying the
constraints imposed by entropic uncertainty relations [24, 25] on typical observables, an inter-
esting problem in its own right, regardless of its connection to locking classical correlations. As
such, and acknowledging that the approximations used here were quite crude, it would be worth
developing a more detailed understanding of the distribution of the quantityminϕ
∑n
j=1H(pj).
VI. DISCUSSION
We have explored a range of cryptographic applications that are based on concentration phe-
nomena in high-dimensional inner product spaces. Most results in quantum information theory
exploit regularities in the structure of the input or operations; Schumacher’s quantum noiseless
coding theorem [20, 26], for example, is based on the fact that for large l, a state ρ⊗l will be almost
entirely supported on an l(S(ρ)+δ)-qubit subspace. The results we presented here are of a related
but different character: the regularity we exploit is inherent in the structure of Cd and, therefore,
doesn’t require any additional constraints.
Our first application was to demonstrate the existence of approximate private quantum chan-
nels capable of achieving exponential security (as measured, for example, by an eavesdropper’s
accessible information) in the number of encrypted qubits while simultaneously using only about
half as much key as the well-known perfectly secure constructions. The failure of bounds on
the size of the secret key from the exact case to apply in our approximate setting exposed a new
distinction between quantum and classical correlations: classical correlations must be destroyed
by local randomization operations while quantum correlations can survive such operations. Our
second application built on this principle to find protocols for LOCC hiding of bipartite quantum
states capable of encoding roughly l qubits in 2l qubits, a significant improvement over previous
constructions. We ended by exhibiting states with locked classical correlations. Such states can
be used to perform surprising communication tasks but also serve as a warning that accessible
information is a potentially volatile measure for use in security definitions.
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Our results here suggest a number of possible directions for future research. One natural ques-
tion is the optimality of the cryptographic protocols we’ve described. While a simple rank ar-
gument ensures that the 1 : 1 asymptotic ratio of secret key bits to encoded qubits achieved by
our approximate private quantum channel is optimal assuming a unitary encryption map, there
appear to be technical obstacles to proving optimality in case of CPTP encryption maps with un-
bounded output dimension. (If the size of the encrypted state is a polynomial function of the
size of the message then the proof is straightforward. One need only combine the argument of
Ref. [6], Section IV with the Fannes inequality [27].) Optimality of the 1 : 2 ratio found for quan-
tum data hiding represents an even bigger challenge; we know of no convincing argument, beset
by technical obstacles or not. At a finer level of detail, since our focus has been on asymptotic
rates, we haven’t made any serious attempt to optimize the constants in our constructions; it
is likely that significant improvements and perhaps simplifications could be found, particularly
in the estimates leading to the locking result. Finally, from a practical point of view, the most
pressing problem would be to find computationally efficient versions of the constructions we
have presented here. Our Appendix A provides one step in this direction in the case of approxi-
mate private quantum channels: instead of selecting unitary transformations from the full unitary
group, it suffices to select them at random from the set of products of Pauli operators. This ran-
dom selection is easily done in polynomial time and the Pauli operators are easily implemented.
Unfortunately, since the number of random selections is exponential in the number of encrypted
qubits, this simplification does not yet yield a polynomial time construction.
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APPENDIX A: BEYOND HAARMEASURE
For some applications, a randomization procedure using a different distribution over unitaries
would be preferable; in data hiding, for example, proving that the decoding procedure succeeds
with high probability would have been greatly facilitated by using Pauli operators instead of
arbitrary unitaries. The convenience appears to come at a price, however. Rather than the strong
operator norm estimate of section II, we have only been able to prove the corresponding result in
trace norm for the general case.
Throughout, we assume only that {Uj : 1 ≤ j ≤ n} are independent U(d)-valued random
variables with density p(U) such that EUjϕU
†
j = I/d. The density function p(U), for example,
could consist of point masses concentrated at tensor products of Pauli operators.
Lemma A.1 For a fixed pure state ϕ, E[‖ 1n
∑n
j=1 UjϕU
†
j − I/d‖1] ≤
√
d/n.
Proof First we evaluate
E


∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2

 = 1
n2
∑
ij
ETr(UiϕU
†
i UjϕU
†
j )−
1
d
. (A1)
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The expectation value is easy to calculate:∑
ij
ETr(UiϕU
†
i UjϕU
†
j ) =
∑
i
ETr(UiϕU
†
i ) +
∑
i6=j
ETr(UiϕU
†
i UjϕU
†
j ) (A2)
= n+
∑
i6=j
Tr
(
I
d
I
d
)
(A3)
= n+ n(n−1)d . (A4)
Therefore, E[ 1n‖
∑n
j=1 UjϕU
†
j − Id‖22] = d−1nd . By the Cauchy-Schwartz inequality and the concavity
of the square-root function, we can then estimate
E


∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1

 ≤ √dE


∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2

 (A5)
≤
√
d

E


∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
2
2




1/2
. (A6)
The lemma then follows by substitution and the trivial inequality d− 1 < d. ⊓⊔
We’ll also make use of Azuma’s inequality:
Lemma A.2 Let (Yj)
n
j=1 be a sequence of real-valued random variables such that |Yj | ≤ 1. Let Sn =∑n
j=1 Yj and S0 = 0. If E[Yj|Sj−1] = 0, then
Pr
(
1
n
Sn ≥ t
)
≤ exp
(−nt2
2
)
. (A7)
Proof See, for example, Ref. [15]. ⊓⊔
Theorem A.3 For sufficiently large d and n = d log d/ǫ2, there exists a choice of {Uj}nj=1 in the support
of p such that the inequality ∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
n
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
I
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≤ ǫ (A8)
holds for all states ϕ.
Proof For n, k ≥ 1, let Zn = ‖
∑n
j=1 UjϕU
†
j − nI/d‖1, Sk = E[Zn|U1, . . . , Uk] − E[Zn] and Yk =
Sk − Sk−1. It’s also convenient to introduce the notation S0 = Y0 = 0. Note that
E[Yk|Sk−1] = E[E[Sk|U1, . . . , Uk−1]− Sk−1|Sk−1] = 0. (A9)
Also, for fixed (U1, . . . , Un) and unitary Uˆk, the triangle inequality gives∣∣∣∣∣∣
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
nI
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
−
∥∥∥∥∥∥
∑
j 6=k
UjϕU
†
j + UˆkϕUˆ
†
k −
nI
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
∣∣∣∣∣∣ (A10)
≤ ‖UkϕU †k − UˆkϕUˆ †k‖1 ≤ 2 (A11)
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so |Yk| ≤ 2. An application of lemma A.2 to Sn =
∑n
k=1 Yk then tells us that
Pr (Zn − E[Zn] ≥ 2nt) ≤ exp
(−nt2
2
)
. (A12)
By the previous lemma, if n ≥ 4d/δ2, then E[Zn] ≤ nδ/2. Therefore, when this condition holds,
we find that
Pr (Zn ≥ nδ) ≤ exp
(−nδ2
32
)
. (A13)
Fix an ǫ/2-netM with |M| ≤ (10/ǫ)2d. Then
Pr

sup
ϕ
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
nI
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ nǫ

 ≤ Pr

max
ϕ∈M
∥∥∥∥∥∥
n∑
j=1
UjϕU
†
j −
nI
d
∥∥∥∥∥∥
1
≥ nǫ
2

 . (A14)
By the union bound and our previous calculations, this probability is less than or equal to
(
10
ǫ
)2d
exp
(−nǫ2
128
)
. (A15)
If n = d log d/ǫ2, then this quantity goes to zero with increasing d. ⊓⊔
APPENDIX B: PROOF OF EQ. (66)
Our goal is to prove that there is a positive constant C ′′ such that
Pr
(
inf
ϕ
1
n
n∑
j=1
H(pj) ≤ (1−ǫ) log d− 3
)
≤ (10ǫ )2d exp
(
− n ( ǫC′′d
2(log d)2
− 1)) ,
where pji = |〈i|U †j |ϕ〉|2.
We begin by estimating the concentration of measure for the entropy of measurement of a
random state. Let |ψ〉 be a pure state chosen from the unitarily invariant measure on Cd, qi =
|〈i|ψ〉|2 and f(|ψ〉) = H(q) the Shannon entropy of the distribution q. We use a version of Levy’s
Lemma [28]:
Lemma B.1 (Levy) Let f : Sk−1 → R be a function with Lipschitz constant σ. Then
Pr
(∣∣f − Ef ∣∣ > η) ≤ 4 exp (−C ′kη2/σ2) , (B1)
for Haar measure on Sk−1 and C ′ > 1/(220 ln 2) a constant.
For our application, k = 2d and the Lipschitz constant can be expressed in terms of the qi:
σ2 = sup
ψ
∇f · ∇f = 4
(ln 2)2
d∑
i=1
qi(1 + ln qi)
2 (B2)
≤ 4
(ln 2)2
d∑
i=1
qi(1 + (ln qi)
2) (B3)
≤ 4
(ln 2)2
(1 + (ln d)2) ≤ 8(log d)2, (B4)
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where the second inequality, true if d ≥ 3, can be shown using Lagrange multipliers. The expec-
tation value of f is log d − ∆(d), with ∆(d) = log d − (12 + 13 + · · · 1d)/(ln 2), which converges to
(1− γ)/(ln 2), where γ is Euler’s constant (approximately 0.577) [29]. Using the estimate [30]
1
2(d + 1)
<
d∑
i=1
1
i
− ln d− γ < 1
2d
, (B5)
we can guarantee that 1/2 < ∆(d) < 1 if d ≥ 7. Thus, choosing η = 2 − ∆(d) and setting
C ′′ = C ′/8, we find
Pr (H(q) < log d− 2) ≤ 4 exp
(
− dC
′′
(log d)2
)
. (B6)
We nowmove on to bounding
∑n
j=1H(pj) for a given ϕ. This is easily done using the Chernoff
bound [15]: if X1, . . . ,Xn are i.i.d. random variables such that Xj ∈ [0, 1] and EX = µ ≥ α ≥ 0,
then
Pr
(
1
n
n∑
j=1
Xj ≤ α
)
≤ exp
(
− nD(α‖µ)
)
(B7)
whereD(·‖·) is the binary divergence function
D(α‖µ) = α logα− α log µ+ (1− α) log(1− α)− (1− α) log(1− µ) . (B8)
Let Xj = 0 whenever H(pj) < log d − 2 and Xj = 1 otherwise. Then (log d − 2)Xj ≤ H(pj) and
by Eq. (B6), EUXj ≥ 1− 4 exp(−dC ′′/(log d)2). Choosing α = 1− ǫ2 and µ = EUXj in the Chernoff
bound, we find
Pr
( 1
n
n∑
j=1
H(pj) ≤ (1− ǫ2)(log d− 2)
)
≤ exp
(
− nD (1− ǫ2‖1− 4 exp( −dC′′(log d)2 )) . (B9)
The divergence can be bounded as follows:
D
(
1− ǫ2‖1− 4 exp( −dC
′′
(log d)2
)
)
≥ −H(ǫ/2)− ǫ+ ǫdC
′′
2(log d)2
(B10)
≥ ǫdC
′′
2(log d)2
− 1. (B11)
The first inequality arises by neglecting themixed term corresponding to α log µ in the divergence,
since it is always nonnegative. The second is valid whenever ǫ < 1/5, which we assume from now
on.
To extend Eq. (B9) to all possible states, choose an ǫ2 -netM for d-dimensional pure states, with
|M| = (10/ǫ)2d. Write ϕ˜ for the net point corresponding to ϕ. Let pj be as previously defined in
terms of ϕ, and p˜j be similarly defined in terms of ϕ˜. Using the union bound,
Pr
(
min
ϕ˜∈M
1
n
n∑
j=1
H(p˜j) ≤ (1− ǫ2)(log d− 2)
)
≤ |M| exp
[
− n
( ǫdC ′′
2(log d)2
− 1
)]
. (B12)
Furthermore, viewing pj and p˜j as postmeasurement states, the monotonicity of the trace norm
implies
‖pj − p˜j‖1 ≤ ǫ2 . (B13)
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Then, applying Fannes’ inequality [27] to the distributions pj and p˜j ,
|H(pj)−H(p˜j)| ≤ ǫ2 log d− ǫ2 log ǫ2 ≤ ǫ2 log d+ 1. (B14)
A substitution then completes the proof.
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